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ABSTRACT: Contrary to standard narratives on the declining function of parties in fostering political partic-
ipation, this article argues that far from abandoning the cause of participation, post-communist political 
parties diversified the understanding of the party as a mobilizing agency by adapting their internal organi-
zations. On the basis of a mid-range number of cases (e.g. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, and Slovakia) the study identified different patterns of evolution within a complex interaction 
effect between participation and organizational development. The peculiarity of the parties’ organization 
and functions has shaped political participation both as an opportunity structure (legitimizing the political 
system and increasing citizens’ involvement in politics) and as a democratic challenge (increasing the pro-
pensity of parties towards populism, ‘seasonal’ membership, corruption and clientelism). 
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1. Introduction 
 
Post-communist parties were born and developed in a context characterized by low 
levels of social trust and community engagement, as well as by limited voluntary asso-
ciational membership. With few exceptions, indicators such as participation in elec-
tions, party membership, the balance of power within a party’s internal life, the level of 
activism among party members (level of subscriptions or time invested in party activi-
ties) or the sense of partisan attachment evidenced from the outset limited commit-
ment to traditional forms of political participation. 
After the mobilization of the late 1980s and the early 1990s, post-communist de-
mocracies registered an abrupt decline in terms of electoral participation, with averag-
es below 40%. The highly emotional character of the ‘inaugural’ elections and the per-
ception that a great deal was at stake (i.e. – a new start) encouraged participation, 
whereas the routinized elections that followed aroused less enthusiasm (Kostadinova 
2003; Pacek et al. 2009). 
In this context, the literature analyzed various determinants in order to gauge the 
depth and breadth of this disenchantment. While some of these determinants are con-
tingent upon post-communist political events, in other cases there are strong similari-
ties with the evolutions identified on Western ground. Cultural explanations focused 
on the post-communist electorates’ limited opportunities to accumulate political learn-
ing and scant party identification. In parallel, a number of studies demonstrated that 
institutional choices were a major explanatory factor. In this regard, Pacek et al. (2009) 
nicely demonstrated that, rather than the presidential or parliamentary elections, vari-
ations in turnout could be linked to the perception of what was at stake in the election 
under scrutiny. Others focused on a variable combination of social and economic hard-
ship and frustration with corrupt politicians (Kostandinova 2009). However, economy-
based explanations were soon challenged on the grounds that the limited electoral 
participation was not exclusively linked to the context of the post-2007 economic crisis; 
the improving economic conditions in most East Central European (ECE) countries dur-
ing the early 2000s did not correspond to a positive trend in terms of electoral partici-
pation. More recent studies have not found any relationship between levels of corrup-
tion and electoral turnout (Pacek et al. 2009). Other scholars have considered the im-
pact of the perception of democracy on the dynamics of electoral participation. Karp 
and Milazzo (2015, 100) have observed that a considerable proportion of citizens in the 
post-communist countries remain skeptical about democracy and dissatisfied with 
democratic performance. Their diagnosis matches Ceka’s observation that voters in 
post-communist polities with higher-quality institutions have lower levels of political 
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trust and participation (2014). The explanation provided is linked to the weight of his-
torical legacies that have left post-communist citizens unprepared to deal with political 
competition. Note also that international factors have been included among the main 
determinants. Vachudova and Hooghe (2009) analyzed the standardizing impact of the 
European Union (EU), which pulled initially divergent political agendas toward the mar-
ket. The complex process of accession drastically limited not only the differences 
among the standard menus of parties, but also the room for maneuver available to 
governing parties and, finally yet importantly, the list of credible options for the elec-
torate. 
In parallel, the growing body of literature focused on the organizational characteris-
tics of post-communist parties and the intimate relationship with the state has empha-
sized their inability to foster representation. The core of the literature consensually 
agrees that post-communist parties gave priority first to their voters and less to their 
traditional membership organizations (Enyedi 2006). Different explanatory factors 
were mentioned. A category of determinants focused on the political context and insti-
tutional legacies, more precisely on the diffusion of anti-political sentiments inherited 
from the 1980s’ traditions of dissidence (van Biezen 2003). Starting with the second 
free elections, the elites’ reluctance to deal with parties progressively vanished1, while 
the citizenry remained ‘sceptical’ about the parties’ roles and performances in the new 
democratic settings.  
The literature consensually pinpointed to the East European parties’ lack of ‘domes-
tic models’ of reference beyond the communist organizational patterns. With relatively 
few exceptions (e.g. the Independent Smallholders’ Party (FKgP) in Hungary or the So-
cial Democratic Party (ČSSD) in the Czech Republic), most of the revived historical par-
ties failed to guarantee organizational continuity with their previous networks. One 
prominent feature of the East European politics used to refer to the successor parties’ 
rapid adaptation to the new political circumstances as a direct consequence of the in-
herited territorial and membership organizations (Grzymala-Busse 2002; van Biezen 
2003). Still, the Polish, Slovak and Hungarian most recent evolutions have progressively 
fine-tuned these assumptions (Haughton and Deegan-Krause 2015). 
A correlated determinant was the ideological fuzziness and instability. Post-
communist parties cultivated their autonomy from the electorate, and valorized their 
‘in office’ functions, while chiselling their ideological profile in compliance with prag-
matic and flexible, all-embracing electoral strategies. After various alternations in pow-
 
1
 The provision from the post-communist constitutions are particularly relevant to this point. Parties are 
generally defined as fundamental democratic institutions participating in the formation of the political will 
of the people (for more details see the following section 3). 
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er, without clear ideological profiles, the parties’ image deficit was emphasized by nu-
merous corruption scandals, and populist parties cyclically multiplied. All in all, 
throughout the entire region, loose coherence between parties, programmes and can-
didates could be identified, with direct consequences in terms of parties’ limited ability 
to motivate voters and, in general, to improve the citizens’ expectations about democ-
racy. In brief, relatively undersized post-communist organizations conformed to the 
two dimensional phenomenon identified by the literature (Scarrow 2000, 83): on the 
demand side, electorally oriented parties had a diminished interest in members’ ser-
vices (either in terms of time spent or resources) considering the intense relationship 
with the state and their professionalization. On the supply side, the citizens’ low inter-
est in enrolling in parties, due to both communist experiences and post-communist dis-
illusionment, testified to a declining political attachment. 
More recent analyses have re-evaluated the relevance of organizational strength. 
Tavits (2012, p. 411) beautifully illustrated that there are solid reasons for parties to 
focus on building strong organizations considering that “party organizational strength 
influences party unity in parliament via collective electoral benefits that it helps to pro-
vide”. In a complementary line of analysis, Gherghina (2014a) has focused on the post-
communist parties’ conceptualization of membership and found empirical evidence 
that political parties with more regulations benefit from having larger membership or-
ganizations. 
Far less attention, however, has been paid to the roles and strategies of parties in 
promoting political socialization and citizens’ participation. The following analysis aims 
to provide a comprehensive comparative analysis of how participation in the post-
communist area evolved, focusing in particular on the extent to which the patterns of 
party organization influence participation. The article thus revisits post-communist par-
ties as agencies of participation by questioning their practices in terms of grassroots 
participation and electoral mobilization. More specifically, the article argues that, de-
spite the parties’ inability to ensure participation in terms of electoral mobilization, 
party identification or political enrollment, in the new democracies parties still rely on 
membership structures in order to ensure alternative party functions (political legiti-
macy, electoral campaigning, financial survival, etc.). However, as the analysis will em-
phasize, most of the traditional party roles have mutated in the region, reinforcing, in 
some cases, defective political behaviors and political pathologies (patronage, popu-
lism). The various elements underpinning the features of political participation both as 
an opportunity structure (legitimizing the political system and increasing citizens’ in-
volvement in politics) and as a democratic challenge (enhancing party propensity to 
populism, ‘seasonal’ membership, corruption and clientelism) will be analyzed in six 
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post-communist countries: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
and Slovakia. For the sake of precision, the three Baltic States and Slovenia have been 
excluded from the analysis. While transition to democracy in the case of the six former 
Warsaw Pact countries has regularly been depicted as a tridimensional process and the 
national integration was less problematic2 (Offe 1991), the process of democratization 
in the post-Soviet countries or former Yugoslavia was shaped by specific variables, in 
primis the complex legal recognition of the borders and of those citizens with multiple 
identities that competed with the newly shaped national allegiance (Kuzio 2001, 169).  
The analysis is organized into four sections. The first reviews the relationship be-
tween participation and party politics. The second section reconstructs the evolution of 
political participation in the post-communist region between 1990 and 2014. The third 
section provides an analysis of the main features of the membership organizations of 
the main parliamentary political parties in terms of party practices. The last section dis-
cusses the data and the theoretical implications of our findings. 
 
 
2. Theoretical framework: political parties and political participation in con-
temporary democracies 
 
Political parties perform an active role in shaping society and ensuring political rep-
resentation. Party functions seem to be perennial, irrespective of historical transfor-
mations (Sartori 2005). Nevertheless, the party role in fostering participation differs 
substantially across time. According to the literature, political parties as agents of de-
mocracy were side effects of the extension of universal suffrage (van Biezen 2003). Ac-
tive grassroots involvement in politics and strong identification with parties came to 
legitimize political organizations. A series of trade-offs within party arrangements con-
tinuously encouraged extensive participation and political mobilization. Party leaders 
formally and substantially empowered party activists, who directly contributed to de-
fining party strategies and provided resources for parties’ organizations. However, re-
cent social-economic, cultural and communicational, institutional and political trans-
formations challenged traditional parties in at least four areas: in their relationship 
with society, in their patterns of organization, in the relation between national and 
transnational parties at a European level, and in their role in national government 
(Müller-Rommel 2016, 2-3). 
Contemporary parties exhibit a systemic inability to act as political linkages between 
 
2
 This was also the case in the velvet division of the former Czechoslovakia.  
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citizens and the state. A two-level failure confirms the profound party decline. On the 
one hand, low electoral turnouts and citizens’ mistrust in parties emerged within a con-
text of high levels of education, new values favoring participatory styles, and weakened 
class structure (Müller-Rommel 2016, 2). On the other hand, the deficit in intra-
organizational management continuously diminishes the impact of party members on 
internal balances of power. This twofold process has widened the gap between citizens 
and political parties. The withdrawal of members from party organizations and the citi-
zens’ focus on private forms of participation has undermined the once classic function 
of connecting citizens and the state (Van Biezen et al. 2012, Mair 2013, Müller-Rommel 
2016). At the same time, parties willingly turned their backs on the public; strengthen-
ing their dependence on the state, and acting, thus, as governing agencies (Mair 2013). 
Exogenous constraints, such as Europeanization, the IMF agreements and the EU 
Commission’s oversight, exacerbate the lack of party responsiveness to citizens’ wants 
and needs (Katz 2014, Müller-Rommel 2016). The limited autonomy of parties in set-
ting policies within intra-party organizations affects the political capacity to tailor col-
lective and selective incentives for party followers (Müller-Rommel 2016). 
Despite the above-mentioned challenges political parties are still the main channels 
of dialogue between political representatives in public offices and the public. Party en-
rollment strategies and intra-party political socialization predefine theoretical expecta-
tions with regards to the creation of viable accountability mechanisms. Party members 
continue to play a role in building governing teams and preparing leaders for public of-
fice, financing the party, and conducting door-to-door electoral campaigns (Seyd and 
Whitely 2002; Scarrow 2014). In some cases, members directly take part in preparing 
elections, contribute to gathering material resources, and ensure voter stability. More-
over, constituency ties become particularly important in times of crisis: bringing mem-
bers back is tantamount, at least rhetorically, to an attempt to recover political credi-
bility. Not all parties are simply abandoning the cause of participation. Numerous in-
ternal reforms have sought to boost voters’ participation in the party decision-making 
process and to increase membership ratios through organizational readjustments – e.g. 
by democratizing leadership selection, enhancing virtual communication with potential 
members, and organizing online platforms for public deliberation (Scarrow 2014). In 
recent decades, statutory opportunity structures endowed party members with in-
creasing formal attributes. For instance, 20% of the parties in European countries de-
mocratized the internal selection of their party leaderships (Pilet and Cross 2014). Even 
in new democracies, often cited as examples of defective political participation and low 
levels of party mobilization, disempowered party rank and file are far from being the 
general rule, at least as regards membership figures (Spirova 2007). 
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In most of the contemporary democracies, efforts by parties to preserve some func-
tion in fostering participation entails, in different formats and with different tools, the 
same mass party strategy: effective trade-offs between party leadership and the elec-
torate together with a secured membership loyalty. In this context, party members are 
genuine representatives of party deliberative democracy, subunits of party organiza-
tions whose empowerment deepens the organizational democratization, but more im-
portantly, the systemic quality of democracy (Katz 2014). Several recent trends point to 
an endeavor to shape large and accountable political organizations. The practice of 
party ‘constitutionalization’ induces parties to create bureaucratized mass organiza-
tions (van Biezen 2012, Casal Bértoa and van Biezen 2014). The contemporary stand-
ards of good practices in party functions directly connect party organizational adapta-
tion and political participation (e.g. The Code of Good Practices in the Field of Political 
Parties). In such documents, defective representation often concerns opaque (corrupt-
ed) party politics. 
The relationship between party organizational transformation and political mobili-
zation substantiates at the normative level the existence of a connection between par-
ty democracy and active citizenship. The disenchantment with party politics directly re-
fers to a party malfunction or superficial party reforms. Parties, now abandoned by ac-
tivists, are increasingly entrenched in the state’s offices and dependent on the state’s 
resources. In practice, this evolution entailed a shift in party functioning, according to 
three distinct scenarios of party linkage decline. 
First, some parties favor party appointees in public offices, whilst political leaders 
distribute selective and collective incentives directly to the public (Blondel 2002). Pat-
ronage and electoral clientelism flourish, particularly in the new democracies, as new 
social and political ties. Political parties, acting as public utilities, consciously opt to ne-
glect the development of local party sections and large membership bases (van Biezen 
and Kopecký 2007). In these cases, organizational adaptation does not include substan-
tial membership empowerment; rather, it encourages personalized decision-making 
networks and the overlap between party employees/officials and party membership 
(van Biezen 2012). An alternative model, though unusual in practice, would allow par-
ties to maintain the grassroots structures – at least at a minimal threshold – through 
the distribution of selective incentives targeting party loyalists (Gauja 2015). 
Second, parties (particularly newly created ones) try to maximize the public dissatis-
faction with politics without genuinely connecting with voters and potential members. 
Parties embrace political appeals constructed on the classic populist dichotomy be-
tween the ‘purity of the people’ versus the ‘corrupt elites’ (Tarchi 2015). The organiza-
tions in this second category are less inclined to ensure legitimacy by numbers. Instead, 
Alexandra Iancu and Sorina Soare, Political Activism: Post-Communist Challenges And Opportunities 
 
159 
 
populist and radical-right parties focus on deliberative procedures within the organiza-
tion as means to ensure participation. 
Third, parties continue their initial evolution unfazed. They experience a constant 
decline in membership, whereas the party leadership remains insulated from the pub-
lic. The parties’ defective behaviors in acting as collective actors and expressing voters’ 
preferences boost the withdrawal of public support even further (party electoral de-
cline, splits, newcomers, etc.). In most of these cases, the active yet disillusioned public 
redirects its attention to alternative forms of participation – such as social movements 
– in order to express discontent with politics (Della Porta and Andretta 2013). 
These three divergent (theoretical) models show a defective party-mass linkage in 
contemporary democracies. In fact, they refer to different narratives of parties’ failure 
to foster participation in contemporary democracies. Although a political party as an 
agency of political participation is the main reference when assessing and reforming 
party functioning, the three dimensions suggest that recent developments widen the 
gap between party leaders and the public. They seem to imply a refusal by parties to 
genuinely adapt to changes in the political environment in order to preserve social ties. 
This article challenges this narrative of party failure. It investigates the emergence of 
the three scenarios of recent party adaptation in the new democracies to point to the 
complementarity of party development strategies and to suggest the compatibility of 
such mutations with the participatory ideal. 
 
 
3. Post-communist parties and the formation of the political will 
 
At the end of the 1980s, a wave of democratization swept through the entire post-
communist area. The former communist countries underwent a complex triple or even 
quadruple transition that simultaneously included transformations of a political, eco-
nomic, and socio-cultural nature along with transformations of ‘stateness’ (Offe 1991). 
By the beginning of the new century, all of those countries had developed institutional 
infrastructures inspired by Western liberal democracies. These immediate changes did 
not succeed in creating authentic democratic settings in all the polities. According to 
Freedom House figures, the successful and rapid diffusion of democratic settings in 
Hungary, Poland or the Czech Republic differs from the hesitant path of Romania, and 
intermittent reforms in Bulgaria or Slovakia. From an economic and social point of 
view, an abrupt drop in GDP, rising unemployment and, more in general, worsened 
macroeconomic conditions and diminished quality of life accompanied the process of 
democratization. In parallel with the general retreat of the state from the provision of 
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social services, the citizens’ sense of exclusion strengthened. Not surprisingly, these el-
ements were regularly cited as particularly fertile ground for disillusionment with poli-
tics, rising corruption, and limited political efficacy. 
From the early 1990s onwards, post-communist parties have been subjected to vari-
ous forms of regulation with direct and indirect consequences on both the demand and 
supply side. The importance of parties was rapidly taken for granted, as testified by the 
consensual constitutionalization of political parties as fundamental democratic institu-
tions (van Biezen 2012) and the prevalence of a militant-kind of democracy (van Biezen 
and Borz 2012). As a direct consequence with of the original imposition of a State act-
ing as a “guardian of democracy” (Casal Bértoa and van Biezen 2014, 300), one of the 
first tasks of the post-communist legislator was the regulation of political parties as or-
ganizations, regulation that exceeded Western criteria (van Biezen and Piccio 2013).  
In direct connection with the shared definition of parties as essential democratic in-
stitutions that participate in the formation of the political will of the people, one of the 
first elements the party laws dealt with was the degree of popular support, in several 
cases coupled with criteria of geographic distribution. The minimum number of mem-
bers required by the party laws varies from 3 members in Romania to 10,000 in Slo-
vakia (Casal Bértoa and van Biezen 2014, 302). A similar heterogeneity emerges in rela-
tion to criteria linked to the parties’ internal life: while the Slovak provision allows a 
relatively high degree of discretion, the regulation of internal structures and processes 
in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania is more prescriptive, requiring, for example, specific 
deadlines for convening their highest organs (Casal Bértoa and van Biezen 2014). When 
it comes to elements like the party organizations’ internal democracy, national regula-
tions delegate these elements to the decision of individual parties’ statutory docu-
ments. On this ground, Gherghina (2014a) observed an asymmetry between the pres-
ence of very few conditions for eligibility to become a member coupled with a wide 
range of rights for these and a lack of specific duties. Moreover, very few statutory 
documents explicitly demand members to get involved in forms of intra-party democ-
racy. It looks like post-communist parties, beyond differences of origins or ideological 
stances, tend to make internal participation optional for their members (Gherghina 
2014a). 
These general observations have one major implication for this study: increases in 
the intensity of the regulation, coupled with changes in other areas such the electoral 
reforms, have been moved by the parliamentary parties’ intent to control the competi-
tion and hamper new parties from successfully entering Parliament (van Biezen and 
Rashkova 2012). These evolutions were possible considering that post-communist par-
ties found themselves from the early 90s onward in the strategic position of being both 
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“the governors and the governed” of the law (Gauja 2010, 7). Over the last decade, 
parties were obliged to make more or less important concessions to domestic and in-
ternational players (e.g. Constitutional Courts, Venice Commission) or networks of 
NGOs and institutes specialized in democracy monitoring in order to smoothen the 
competition requirements.  
In parallel with the definition of the regulation of political parties as organizations, 
the post-communist legislator took (rapid) interest in codifying party finances as a way 
to prop parties with under-developed organizations (Booth and Robbins 2010). In most 
cases, a single document was issued containing both provisions on party organization 
and financial resources (Casal Bértoa and van Biezen 2014). Subject to regular amend-
ments, van Biezen and Rashkova (2012) observed that the most substantial expansion 
of regulation in terms of party politics has occurred in the area of party financing in 
particular, which is compliant with the national and international increased pressures 
to enhance transparency and to fight corruption. Less consensual observations emerge 
in relation to the impact on party system. While authors like Booth and Robbins (2010) 
link the availability of funds to a decreased level of party replacement and volatility, 
more skeptical diagnoses are provided by scholars like Tavits (2007). 
 
 
3.1. Post-communist parties and the endemic decline of political participation 
 
Whilst the initial leitmotiv praised parties as barometers of democracy, they have 
rapidly become the troublemakers of politics. Nevertheless, as illustrated by Figure 1, 
there is an important variation in the level of trust across both space and time. Average 
levels of trust as low as 10.73% can be found in Romania, while average levels of over 
15% can be found in Hungary and Poland. At the national level, the highest level of 
trust is registered in Hungary in 2010 (29%), two months after Fidesz’s sweeping victo-
ry associated not only with a highly discredited left-wing pillar, but also with expecta-
tions that Fidesz would put Hungary back on track for economic growth after the risks 
of financial collapse under the previous socialist government. At the other extreme, 
trust levels of 5% can be found in 2004 (Poland). 
Political participation did not live up to the initial expectations. Within the 
proportional-based systems, the choice of closed or (semi-) open list do not generate 
different evolutions in terms of electoral participation. On this ground, the 
representational exclusion in post-communist Europe was consequently high in 
comparison with Western democracies, in particular during the first decade. In parallel, 
while the party system size tended to be larger in the post-communist area than in 
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consolidated Western democracies, the effective numbers of parliamentary parties in 
the most recent elections3 declined in Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia, where-
as it has gone up in the Czech Republic and Bulgaria. 
 
Figure 1 - Evolution of trust in post-communist political parties (2004-2014) 
 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer survey 
 
 
Figure 2 - Post-communist electoral participation (voter turnout 1990-2014) 
 
Source: IDEA Voter Turnout Database  
 
Since 1990, 47 parliamentary elections have been organized in the six countries ana-
lyzed. On average, parliamentary elections have been held every three years. In the 
first quarter century of post-communism, electoral data show an abrupt decline of vot-
 
3
 Based on Gallagher (2015). 
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er turnout in all the countries (Figure 2). The average regional value of the electoral 
turnout has remained well below the EU average, although large fluctuations can be 
observed (Pacek et al. 2009). If we refer to the trends in terms of voter turnout (calcu-
lated as total number of votes cast for the lower chamber divided by the number of 
registered voters – Figure 2), the highest level of electoral participation was registered 
in the 1990 Czechoslovakian elections (96.33), while the lowest percentage was rec-
orded in Romania on the occasion of the 2008 parliamentary elections (39.2). Bearing 
in mind the differences between one election and another within the same country or 
potential variations due to elections for different institutions, the Romanian electorate 
illustrates the most rapid passage from euphoria to apathy, followed by Bulgaria, Slo-
vakia and the Czech Republic. In Poland and Hungary, levels of participation are subject 
to fewer variations. On average, the Slovak electorate is characterized by the highest 
level of mobilization, closely followed by the Czech case. The Bulgarian, Hungarian, and 
the Romanian cases are in-between in terms of turnout average. Poland is character-
ized by the lowest level of electoral participation in our sample. Two main scenarios 
emerge from these findings. The first pledges in favor of a post-communist voter 
‘‘withdrawal’’ due to hostility against a disappointing political arena, while the other 
scenario emphasizes the broad room for maneuver available to new political for-
mations based on personalist and populist appeals (Pop-Elecheş 2010). 
Before we discuss how parties behave in this context pervaded by electoral disen-
chantment, it is important to assess the general features of post-communist parties’ 
relations with organizational matters. Considering the regional lack of familiarity with 
democracy, the low level of partisan continuity, as well as the dilettante character of 
politics in the early 1990s, as previously observed, post-communist parties focused 
their attention almost exclusively on electoral mobilization. By the second elections, 
most of the anti-communist groups or clubs and the other early 1990s parties had 
changed from conglomerate groups to parties based on individual membership in 
compliance with the requirements of the party laws already in force; but, for the most 
part, they maintained loose organizational settings and weak ideological features. 
Despite variation across countries and across political parties within the same coun-
try, as well as variation across time, scholars agree that the classic model of mass party 
organization has had limited visibility in post-communism. Note that the level of party 
membership in the new European democracies (taken as a percentage of the national 
electorate) is well below the M/E ratio of the long-established democracies4. Compari-
 
4
 The aggregate data we are presenting in Table 1 is based on information provided by individual parties 
(see the different sources quoted). The usual caveats apply: the data reliability and the lack of comprehen-
sive and detailed party records (Mair and van Biezen 2001). 
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son of data from the end of the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st century 
(Table 1) shows that the average membership — both in absolute number and as a 
percentage of the electorate — is lower for all of our cases with the exception of Bul-
garia, which indicates a synergy with the downward trend identified in Western de-
mocracies (van Biezen et al. 2012). Overall, Bulgaria and Romania’s electorates exhibit 
higher levels of party membership, while the lowest levels belong to Hungary and Po-
land 
 
Table 1 - Post-Communist Party Enrollment 
Country Year Total party mem-
bership  
(M) 
Membership as % of electorate 
(M/E)  
Bulgaria 1990s n.a n.a 
2002 443600 6.41 
2008 399121 5.6 
Czech Republic 1993 545000 7.04 
1999 319800 3.94 
2008 165425 1.99 
Hungary 1990 165300 2.11 
1999 173600 2.15 
2008 123932 1.54 
Poland 1990s n.a n.a 
2000 326500 1.15 
2009 304465 0.99 
Romania 1990 n.a n.a 
2003 1304729 7.07 
2007 1129735 6.2 
Slovakia 1994 127500 3.29 
2000 165277 4.11 
2007 86296 2.02 
M –  the aggregate sum for the overall level of membership across all parties for which figures are available (expressed 
in raw numbers);.M/E ratio - party membership taken as a percentage of the national electorate (registered voters in 
previous elections).  
Membership measured as change in percentage points Sources: Mair and Van Biezen (2001), Spirova (2005), Ionaşcu 
and Soare (2011), Van Biezen et al. (2012). 
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4. Organizational development and participation 
 
In the East Central European (ECE) region, the weak party grassroots and the visible 
decline in political mobilization contributed to a volatile political scene. Numerous 
changes occurred in the party systems in the region – above all favoring party switch-
ing, party mergers, and splits as means of political survival (Gherghina 2014a, 2014b). 
Several adaptive features alternatively prevailed in order to tame the ongoing party 
decline. At the structural level, a certain degree of organizational continuity and adap-
tation directly contributed to the predictability of party politics and party activism. Or-
ganizational continuity and strength constitute catalysts in shaping and maintaining 
party-member and party-voter relations. At the infra-party level, organizational incen-
tives also favored participation. Inclusive candidate selection procedures, for instance, 
could increase the internal party democracy and act as incentives to participate in the 
party life. Alternatively, political parties may also choose ideological repositioning or 
rhetorical adaptations. For instance, new party leaders could disregard the traditional 
structure of incentives and choose to radicalize or polarize the political claims in order 
to elude the issue of legitimacy by numbers (and thus the entire issue of participation). 
Such political shortcuts in redefining the party as an agency of participation emerged 
under the different forms in all the countries in our sample. 
 
4.1. Structural determinants – organizational stability and strength 
 
In the post-communist region, most party systems are far from being stable. The elec-
toral failure of mainstream parties or the rise in power of new parties introduced polit-
ical uncertainty, disenchanted citizens and the erosion of confidence in the democratic 
institutions. While almost all parties in Romania, the Czech Republic, and Hungary sur-
vived through the 1990s, countries such as Poland and Slovakia saw major party re-
shuffles in the early 2000s, and only recently have they shown patterns of party re-
stabilization (Haughton and Dee gan-Krause 2015).  
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Table 2 - Party membership in the ECE parties 
COUNTRY PARTY 1990-2000 2000-2010 2010-present 
  Mean 
M/E 
STD Mean 
M/E 
STD Mean 
M/E 
STD 
Hungary MSZP 0.51 0.07 0.41 0.04 0.38 0.02 
FIDESZ 0.15 0.05 0.32 0.12 0.50 0.00 
SZDSZ 
 
0.33 0.12 0.31 0.04   
MDF 
 
0.33 0.05 0.27 0.07 0.14 0.00 
FKGP 
 
0.94 0.33 1.44 0.09   
Czech Repub-
lic 
KSČM 
 
2.37 0.79 1.19 0.24 0.73 0.06 
ČSSD 
 
0.17 0.04 0.21 0.02 0.28 0.01 
KDU-ČSL 
 
0.82 0.11 0.57 0.08 0.39 0.03 
ODS 0.27 0.02 0.29 0.07 0.31 0.07 
Poland SLD 0.26* na 0.33 0.12 0.16 0.05 
PSL 0.58* na 0.45 0.06 0.42 0.01 
PiS     0.07 0.00 
PO   0.08 0.02 0.15 0.01 
Romania PSD 2.38 2.37 2.67 0.92 2.61 0.27 
PNTCD 2.21 2.11 0.26 0.09 0.18 0.02 
PNL   0.57 0.14 0.18 0.02 
PD 1.36 0.79 0.69 0.19 1.07 0.69 
Slovakia HZDS 1.09 0.56 0.87 0.13 0.33 0.28 
SDL 0.6 0.11     
KDH 0.6 0.23 0.43 0.11 0.31 0.04 
SDKU-DS   0.14 0.04 0.12 0.04 
SMER-SD 
 
  0.28 0.11 0.37 0.01 
M/E–  individual party membership taken as a percentage of the national electorate registered in previous elections; 
Mean M/E – the mean value of the M/E ratio for each of the three periods; STD – standard deviation  
Source: Own calculations based on registration figures from International IDEA, Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance online: http://www.idea.int; the membership figures are taken from the Members and Activists of Political 
Parties project: http://www.projectmapp.eu. (For the countries: Poland (Pacześniak 2014), Slovakia (Zemanik, 2015), 
Hungary (Enyedi, 2014), Czech Republic (Linek, 2014), Romania (Ionaşcu and Soare 2014). For Poland see van Biezen et 
al. 2012, Szczerbiak 2013. 
*based on average membership (Tavits 2013) 
 
Hungary: MSZP- Hungarian Socialist Party; FIDESZ- Hungarian Civic Alliance; SZDSZ - Alliance of Free Democrats – Hun-
garian Liberal Party; MDF- The Hungarian Democratic Forum; FKGP- The Independent Smallholders' Party; Czech Repub-
lic: KSČM- The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia; ČSSD- The Czech Social Democratic Party; KDU-ČSL- The 
Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People's Party; ODS- The Civic Democratic Party; Poland: SLD -
Democratic Left Alliance; PSL-The Polish People's Party; PiS- Law and Justice; PO-Civic Platform; Romania: PSD- Social 
Democratic Party; PNTCD- The Christian Democratic National Peasants' Party; PNL-National Liberal Party; PD-
Democratic Party; Slovakia: HZDS The People's Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia; SDL - The Party of the 
Democratic Left; KDH- The Christian Democratic Movement; SDKU-DS The Slovak Democratic and Christian Union – 
Democratic Party; SMER-SD -Direction – Social Democracy. 
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While the Bulgarian socialists remained unchallenged, regular changes in the composi-
tion of the center-right political supply occurred. Overall, post-communist party politics 
have been characterized by regular swings in parliamentary composition and doors 
wide open to new (atypical) parties and candidates. Both party and electoral regula-
tions contributed to this volatile party behavior. Nevertheless, new parties continuous-
ly succeeded to win representation in Parliament, rebooting from time to time the po-
litical system and challenging the creation of stable party organizations (see Table 25). 
In terms of organizational development, two clusters of countries emerged (Tables 1 
and 2). On the one hand, the parties in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic suffer 
from organizational anemia. On the other hand, outliers such as Romania and Bulgaria 
encourage participation. In these latter cases, legislative provisions establishing both 
constraints on party enrollment in electoral campaigns and positive incentives to run 
for office induced parties to engage in a race to obtain members and supporters (Gher-
ghina 2014a). Despite these trends, the analysis of parties as agents of participation 
remains disputed. First, the overall enrollment figures raise questions about data relia-
bility (particularly when official party claims on membership figures are compared with 
individual level surveys). For instance, even though Poland is the extreme example of 
low party mobilization (Gwiazda 2009) and Romania represents the other end of the 
spectrum with its extreme organizational solidity (Ionaşcu and Soare 2011), the capaci-
ty of parties to gather followers seems quite similar in various surveys. Recent EVS data 
show comparable percentages of unaffiliated citizens: 95.3% in Poland and 91.65% in 
Romania. The Romanian 2.9% active party membership is the highest ratio in the re-
gion. However, the differences across post-communist countries are not significant. 
Second, the membership figures should be assessed with caution because of the high 
levels of intra-country variations. Not all parties failed to develop party organizations, 
just as not all parties abandoned the cause of political participation. Exceptions rapidly 
emerged in all our cases.  
A peculiar situation concerned the Polish Solidarność, which inherited the 1980s 
trade union network with a membership then estimated at around ten million; but by 
the time of its renewed status in the 1990s, membership was only around 20% (Ale-
ksandrowicz et al. 2009, 19). The Czech KSČM, the Bulgarian Socialists and the Romani-
an Social-Democrats continued unhindered the politics of mobilization and electoral 
recruitment (Grzymala-Busse 2002, Spirova 2005, Gherghina 2014b). Although in both 
Romania and Bulgaria, the successor parties’ one million members may have been 
overestimated in the early 1990s (Szajkovski 1991, Spirova 2005), the left-wing parties 
 
5
 The data in Table 2 illustrate the evolution in the mean of M/E ratio over three periods: 1990-2000, 
2000-2010, 2010-present. 
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benefited from a mass party bureaucratized organization and an unparalleled ability to 
reach territorial units. The subsequent membership figures, accounting for 2% of the 
Romanian electorate, are quite similar to those of the Bulgarian BSP in the 2000s. Even 
in countries where the renewed social-democracy parties did not survive, such as the 
Slovak Party of the Democratic Left (SDL), the social-democrats’ pattern of organization 
dominated the political scene in the 1990s (Table 2). The Slovakian HZDS illustrates the 
organizational hegemony of the (populist) left parties during the initial phase of transi-
tion. The initial advantage of the successor parties had virtually no counterweight in 
terms of enrollment (Table 2). The Polish Peasants’ Party represents a major exception; 
at various times, its membership exceeds that of all other parties and has one of the 
most capillary territorial structure (Tavits 2013). 
 
Table 3. Causal explanations for the decline in the party participatory function  
 Bulgaria Poland Hunga-
ry 
Romania Czech  
Republic 
Slovakia 
Party age Partially 
stable 
Re-
stabiliza-
tion 
Stable  
 
Stable  
 
De-
Stabiliza-
tion  
 
Re-
stabiliza-
tion 
New parties (% seats)* 10.83 15.22 19.10 14.79 30.5 10.67 
Candidate selection 
(centraliza-
tion/decentralization) 
Central-
ized 
(but 
struc-
tural 
volatili-
ty) 
Moderate 
Centrali-
zation  
Highly 
central-
ized 
Moderate 
Centrali-
zation 
Moderate 
Centrali-
zation  
Centrali-
zation 
Membership  High Low Low High Low Low 
Populist/Radical Claims Radical-
ism 
Populism 
& Radi-
calism 
Radical-
ism 
Populism Populism Populism 
*Electoral results, most recent parliamentary elections (Chamber of Deputies) 
 
The frailty of the post-communist camp gave rise to weak and fluid right-wing party 
organizations. Exceptionally, in Romania, the Christian Democrats’ (PNTCD), the most 
important opponent of the social-democrats during the 1990s, managed to counter-
balance the social democrats’ organizational drive. The party declared 800000 mem-
bers in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, subsequent party records from the party’s time 
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in government, 1996-2000, listing between 150,000 and 200,000 persons, suggest its 
lack of capacity to build strongholds and a general culture of party activism. 
Party age played an important role in developing party participatory functions (Table 
3). Starting in the 2000s, parties on the right side of the political spectrum were able to 
evolve in terms of co-opting and including new members. The phenomenon was far 
from being homogenous. In Hungary, both of the main parliamentary parties remained 
uninterested in the idea of recruiting members (Enyedi and Linek 2008, 461). The 
FIDESZ steadily increased its membership in the 2000s, but the M/E ratio was inferior 
to those of other countries and parties in the region (Table 3). Paradoxically, in Hunga-
ry, the only party to accomplish the objective of mass organization was the Independ-
ent Smallholders, Agrarian Workers and Civic Party (FKgP). The party became the lead-
er of the opposition at the end of the 1990s. Despite high membership figures, FKgP 
did not survive corruption scandals and internal divisions in the 2000s (Landsford 
2015). Divergent evolutions characterize the right-wing parties in post-communist 
countries. The Czech KDU-ČSL was able to reach a small yet stable electorate in the ru-
ral and catholic areas. Nevertheless, after the 1990s the party suffered a continuous 
membership decline. The Romanian liberals, although successful in organizing the party 
and building organizations in the 2000s, also show signs of declining membership fig-
ures. Conversely, in Poland, the newly-created conservative and liberal parties (such as 
Civic Platform (PO) or Law and Justice (PiS) both created in 2001) maintained low 
membership bases and loose organizational structures. Electoral support, and the sta-
bilization of party roles as parliamentary and governmental parties, did not foster par-
ticipation. 
 
4.2. Internal structure of incentives: organizational reforms and party democracy 
 
In the literature, the eclectic configurations of the ECE parties are directly connected 
to internal arrangements and organizational strategies. The differences among parties 
as agencies of participation seem to suggest a ‘reluctance’ to reach constituents or the 
leaders’ strategic interests in preserving disempowered audiences. Previous studies 
have suggested that, in the past decade and in the case of mainstream parties, party 
statutory arrangements’ (e.g. the degree of specification and the substantive structure 
of incentives claimed by the parties’ formal documents) impact on membership figures 
(Gherghina 2014a). Citizens in the region seem to pay attention to party initiatives to 
democratize the organizations. From this perspective, the absence of political reforms 
may explain why some parties are failing to mobilize voters and activists. Despite the 
myriad of rights and obligations mentioned in some party statutory provisions, ECE 
Partecipazione e conflitto, 9(1) 2016: 152-180, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v9i1p152 
  
170 
 
parties lack a genuine membership empowerment. For instance, the tendency to hold 
party primaries is still marginal in the post-communist democracies. There is a wide va-
riety of cases in regard to the structure of formal incentives provided by the post-
communist parties (Table 3). 
At one extreme, the Hungarian parties have undergone few reconfigurations over 
time and maintain high levels of centralization (Ilonszki and Várnagy 2014). The elite-
driven parties reject elements of substantial party democratization. Marginal proce-
dures giving the appearance of democratization have not fundamentally changed the 
functioning of parties - e.g. the Social Democrats have codified a nomination procedure 
whereby candidates for party leadership can either be supported by a special commit-
tee or should gather the support of at least one third of the electors (Ilonszki and 
Várnagy 2014). 
Moderate quests to decentralize the candidate selection process emerged in other 
countries in the region. For instance, in Slovakia, most parties such as the Slovak Na-
tional Party, the Hungarian Community Party, the People’s Party, the Christian Demo-
cratic Movement select and recall the party chairmen through party conventions. Only 
the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKÚ-DS) tried to innovate by providing 
party members with the ability to select the electoral party leader in party primaries 
(Rybář and Deegan-Krause 2009). In practice, only moderate levels of internal party 
competition and little membership empowerment emerged in the Slovakian case. In a 
similar situation, in Poland the election of party leadership depends primarily on party 
Congresses (Hartliński 2013). Other party bodies can select or remove from office the 
president of the party in-between congresses – such in the cases of the Democratic 
Left Alliance or the Polish People’s Party. Recently reformed, two parties also allow for 
the organization of party primaries: The Civic Platform (PO) since 2013 and the Demo-
cratic Left alliance (since 2012 but only as an alternative route in leadership selection). 
Despite these reforms, the incumbency levels remain high and there is a closed struc-
ture of party competition in what concerns party leadership structures (Hartliński 
2013). At the opposite extreme, the Romanian mainstream parties have undergone 
numerous internal reforms both in what concerns the recruitment of party leadership 
and of party representatives in public offices. Since 2002, the Liberals have adopted for 
several years an internal procedure based on a “meritocratic criterion”. The party lead-
ership had the right to draw up the candidate lists for local branches with poor elec-
toral performances. Conversely, the national leadership only validated the lists of can-
didates provided by local organizations when local electoral results had been above the 
national average. In 2003, the Social Democrats implemented the closed primaries sys-
tem (for two-thirds of the candidates running for the Parliament) but the procedure 
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was applied on only one occasion. In the Romanian case, the various reforms paid off. 
Romanian parties are one of few examples of high levels of leadership renewal. Never-
theless, in all the above cases, the party configurations of power did not entail major 
outcomes in terms of membership recruitment (or, at least at first glance, in the elec-
toral performance). In the Hungarian case, the Socialists did not improve their mem-
bership figures, whereas in the Romanian case no substantial change at the grassroots 
level resulted from various reforms. In this latter example, even recent non-codified 
procedures (e.g. the most inclusive and decentralized candidate selection procedure 
based on opinion polls) do not entail changes in the membership structures. Restrictive 
formal provisions act in a similar manner. Specific stipulations codifying the need for a 
‘recommendation’ in order to join a party should foster internal cohesion; but at the 
same time they are major impediments to shaping inclusive party membership re-
cruitment. Such dispositions can be found in the Polish case, which is well known for its 
weak grassroots. Nevertheless, similar demands have emerged in the case of parties 
with signs of membership consolidation, such as FIDESZ in Hungary, or in cases of high 
levels of electoral encapsulation – the Social Democrats in Romania (applied in the ear-
ly 2000s). 
 
 
4.3. Radicalism or populism as a substitute for traditional participation 
 
The continuous endeavor to publicize (the appearance of) more democratic patterns of 
party adaptation is insufficient to assess the impact of formal party arrangements on 
membership recruitment. Selective incentives that matter for the potential activists 
(e.g. jobs, financial benefits) are informally defined. Party patronage and electoral cli-
entelism characterized the region even after the enlargement. Throughout the 2000s, 
numerous corruption scandals generated governmental turnovers, with allegations of 
illegal campaign financing, mismanagement of state funds, and the political engineer-
ing of bureaucratic appointments in order to favor party loyalists (Meyer-Sahling and 
Veen 2012, Batory 2012, Fink-Hafner 2014). The spoils systems and corruption scandals 
altered political participation (Pacek et al. 2009). However, the absent public did not 
become a political issue and did not change the parties’ strategies in terms of inclu-
siveness and participation. Instead, new parties emerged claiming to be the genuine 
representations of an absent public. Populist appeals condemning the ‘predatory elites’ 
concerned either the sporadic reactivation of transitional justice and the lustration is-
sue or the extrapolation of the systemic outcomes of the fight against corruption (Pop-
Elecheş 2010). Ultranationalist and racist programs consistent with radical forms of 
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populism gained representation in Parliaments. Paradoxically, despite their different 
narratives on participation and democracy, the new movements suffered from weak 
organizations in regard to both internal cohesion and membership figures (Table 4). 
Mass media and marginal groups became key tools for gathering electoral support. For 
example, the Czech extreme-right Workers Party (now banned) was riven by internal 
quarrels. The party’s strategy of establishing an alliance with a neo-Nazi movement 
benefited it in terms of activism, but this assumed the form of paramilitary organiza-
tions (Mareš 2012). Nationalist and xenophobic electoral platforms emerged in Bulgar-
ia as well. In the case of Ataka, created by a journalist, Volen Siderov, the media played 
a substantial role in the dissemination of the party’s messages (Stefanova 2009). Ataka 
used anti-Turk and anti-Roma rhetoric coupled with an anti-corruption discourse in or-
der to mobilize voters (Genov 2010), but the structure of activists and members re-
mained weak. Anti-Roma sentiments prevailed in Hungary as well (Pirro 2014). The 
new technologies became the main tools of mobilization (Varga 2014). Jobbik, like the 
Bulgarian Ataka, relied on rallies in order to promote its ideas. In the case of the 2000 
wave of populist parties, the denunciation of corrupted elites was the core of the al-
ternative parties. Polish parties also maximized anti-corruption claims and the rhetoric 
of crisis (e.g. Self-Defense and the League of Polish Families). These small organizations 
benefited from active and committed activists usually organized through media outlets 
(Jasiewicz 2008). 
 
Table 4 - Radical parties’ membership/electorate in the ECE countries 
  Mean M/E 
1990-2000 
Mean M/E 
2000-2010 
Mean M/E 
2010-2014 
Romania PRM 0.17 0.98 0.28 
PPDD   0.27 
Slovakia SNS 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
HZDS 1.09 0.87 0.33 
Poland SPR   0.35 0.01 
LPR  0.02 NA 
Hungary Jobbik  0.04 0.15 
Czech Republic ANO-2011   0.02 
PS   0.00 
M/E –  individual party membership taken as a percentage of the national electorate (registered in previous elections). 
Mean M/E – the mean value of the M/E ratios (for each of the three periods) 
Source: Own calculations based on the Members and Activists of Political Parties project: http://www.projectmapp.eu 
(Poland (Pacześniak 2014), Slovakia (Zemanik, 2015), Hungary (Enyedi, 2014), Czech Republic (Linek, 2014), Romania 
(Ionaşcu and Soare 2014). 
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Not all of these parties were essentially xenophobic. New parties denouncing the 
corruption of the establishment and the lack of political accountability emerged in dif-
ferent formulas, and they rapidly achieved electoral success. In the Czech Republic, the 
anti-corruption party formed by a Czech oligarch (Andrej Babiš), in spite of its low 
membership, obtained 18% of the votes at the elections after three months of exist-
ence (Linek 2014). The party falls less under the label of classic radical politics as it 
adopts mainly an anti-establishment and populist style of conducting electoral cam-
paigns (van Kessel, 2015). In a similar vein, adopting the same Berlusconian model as 
ANO 2011, the Romanian PPDD emerged in 2011. Dan Diaconescu was the party’s in-
formal leader, owner, and main host of a television talk show. Diaconescu used the 
narrow circle of TV station staff to rule the party, but also local independents, busi-
nessmen, and TV audiences in order to build up a membership base. The party’s grass-
roots were weak compared with those of other mainstream parties. Nevertheless, the 
party came third in the following electoral year. At the same time, the durability of 
these parties, irrespective of membership bases, varies markedly across the region. 
While PPDD has been informally dissolved in Parliament, and Samoobrona has disap-
peared from the legislative arena, other new parties, either radical parties (Jobbik), or 
populist anti-establishment parties (ANO 2011) seem to have stabilized as mainstream 
competitors. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
After an initial wave of revolutionary enthusiasm in the early 1990s, political partici-
pation rapidly declined across the entire post-communist region. Electoral turnouts 
dropped, and trust in political parties vanished. Overall, political parties – already very 
weak organizations – became isolated from the rest of society. This lack of public par-
ticipation and disillusionment can be associated with a wide range of determinants: in-
stitutions, political culture, socio-economic indicators, international factors, etc. Schol-
ars have argued that democracy without voters and parties without members are 
common phenomena in post-communism. This interpretation tends to overlook the 
fact that not all the parties behave in the same manner. Some parties initially remained 
highly committed to the mass model of party organization they inherited; the Czech 
KSČM, the Polish SLD and PSL, the Bulgarian BSP, the Romanian PDSR and, to a lesser 
extent, the Hungarian MSzP and FKgP offered a powerful counter-example to the gen-
eral trends in this regard and partially conserved their inherited territorial organization 
and membership. After a decade, even in these cases the once disciplined mass organi-
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zation loosened or even completely vanished. The Polish SLD is an example of this phe-
nomenon. Note that while the legislator in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia 
introduced public funding in the immediate period after the fall of the communist re-
gime, in the rest of the sample the funding of political parties was initially kept to the 
private sphere (Casal Bértoa and van Biezen 2014). Still, in none of the cases subsidies 
were contingent upon the parties’ ability to generate membership contributions. 
When focusing on conventional forms of participation such as party politics, diver-
gent patterns of evolution can be identified. 
First, despite the decline of confidence in political parties and public institutions, not 
all the post-communist parties have failed to become agents of political participation. 
For instance, some of the successor parties have managed (at least temporarily) to pre-
serve their membership organizations. They have even set a trend in regard to the ne-
cessity of party activism for political success (e.g. the socialists in Bulgaria, in Poland or 
in Romania). Whilst their success has been temporary in the Polish case, the Bulgarian 
and Romanian socialist parties have remained central political actors for over a quarter 
of century. 
Second, although the literature emphasizes the role of democratic incentives in re-
cruiting new members – e.g. an active role in the leadership selection process, surveys, 
decision-making abilities, etc. – in the ECE region it seems that rather informal struc-
tures of rewards explain the high variation in party organizational adaptation. Specific 
privileges and incentives act as substitutes in the chain of representation. However, the 
lack of political participation is not necessarily a form of public contestation. The emer-
gence of anti-establishment parties, although they gathered an impressive number of 
votes in a very short time, did not change the party organizational configurations. Polit-
ical parties from the 2000s populist wave, initially social-movements, did not embrace 
the participatory mechanisms or large organizations. Contestation through rallies and a 
small but very active (and sometimes violent) body of loyalists were important in shap-
ing the new parties. New technologies and mainstream media were crucial in dissemi-
nating party messages. The new parties claiming to represent the silent public do not 
embrace dissimilar organizational arrangements. The anti-establishment parties re-
main highly elitist, incapable of boosting large-scale mobilization or fostering more ac-
tive citizens. 
Finally, the most important finding of this analysis is that not all Eastern Europeans 
behave in the same manner, at the same time and in a continuous way. Parties vary in 
shape and in size, they serve many different purposes, and they have different views 
on conventional participation. 
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